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Case No. 20090146-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Luis CRISTOBAL, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for criminal mischief, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2) (c) (West 2004), as enhanced to a second degree 
felony pursuant to the group criminal activity enhancement provision, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(2) (West 2004).1 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support enhancement to a second degree 
felony pursuant to the group criminal activity enhancement provision? 
1
 Defendant does not challenge his underlying criminal mischief 
conviction, nor does he challenge his convictions for contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-2301 (West 2004), and criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a) (West Supp. 2006). 
Standard of Review. "In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, '[the appellate court] 
will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [it] conclude [s] that some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the 
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt/ " State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 
5 ,1 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 (Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004); and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of criminal 
mischief, enhanced to a second degree felony pursuant to the group criminal 
activity enhancement provision; one count of driving without a valid driver's 
license, a class B misdemeanor; three counts of contributing to the delinquency 
of a minor, all class B misdemeanors; and one count of criminal trespass, a class 
B misdemeanor. R.4-3; R.189:40,158. Following a preliminary hearing, 
Defendant was bound over to stand trial on all charges but driving without a 
license, which was dismissed. R.188:32-33. 
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At trial, only the criminal mischief charge and gang enhancement was 
submitted to the jury. See R.109-05. Defendant pled guilty to criminal trespass 
and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; the State dismissed 
the remaining two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. R.109-
05. At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on 
the enhancement charge, but his motion was denied. R.189:134-37. The jury 
later found Defendant guilty of criminal mischief, with the aid or 
encouragement of two or more persons. R.103. 
Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment on the 
enhancement charge. R.114, 124-15. The trial court denied the motion and 
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years. 
R.136-28,139,145. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R.153-52,159-58. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the early morning hours of June 22, 2008, Joshua Eldridge was 
working patrol as a security officer for Centurion Security. R.189:49-52. At 
approximately 1:00 a.m., he drove by the Savers thrift store in Orem, but found 
no unusual activity. R.189:56,59-60. When he returned about two hours later, 
he saw a car with its headlights off parked next to a Savers' delivery truck. 
R.189:52-54. A male stood next to the car, speaking with two young girls sitting 
inside the car —later determined to be 12- and 13-years old. R.189:53-54,60-
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61,85,92-94. The male fled down the street when Eldridge turned on his 
spotlight and approached the car. R.189:53-54,60-61. 
Before exiting his car, Eldridge saw gang-related graffiti all over the 
Savers building, which had not been there during his first patrol of the area. 
R.189:56-57. When Eldridge approached the car on foot, he saw in his 
peripheral vision another male, with two spray paint cans in hand, run behind a 
storage shed next to the Savers building. R.189:54-55,61-62. Eldridge then 
walked toward the storage unit, but before reaching it, noticed that someone 
had approached him from behind. R.189:55. Startled, Eldridge drew his baton 
and turned around to find Defendant and 16-year-old Juan, the male who had 
fled behind the storage shed. R.189:55-56,62-63,66,70,85,95-97; SE18.2 Eldridge 
handcuffed the two men, sat them on the ground next to the Savers building, 
and notified police. R.189:56,59,63-64,70,126,132. Officers arrived shortly after. 
R.189:59,69. 
In addition to the Savers building, a Savers delivery truck parked behind 
the building, a dumpster, and a portable storage shed had also been tagged with 
gang-related, blue and silver graffiti. R.189:56,73-75. "Provo PVL x 3" and 
"PVL" had been sprayed on the building in blue and silver. R.189:74; SE1; SE2. 
2
 Because Juan was a juvenile at the time of the offense, the State will refer 
only to his first name. 
-4-
"PVL x 3," "RJC" crossed out, and a profanity had been sprayed in blue on the 
delivery truck. R.189:75; SE3; SE4. "Loco" had been sprayed in silver on the 
dumpster. R.189:75; SE5. And "STG" had been sprayed in silver on the portable 
storage shed. R.189:75,130-31; SE6. 
Police later discovered that Defendant had PVL tatooed on his stomach 
and Juan had "STG" written on his hand. R.189:78-79,130-31. When police 
arrived on the scene, the smell of spray paint was still present and the paint was 
still wet. R.189:57,82,127. Two spray paint cans were found behind the storage 
shed — one silver and one blue. R.189:58,65-66. Police found a blue spray paint 
cap on the passenger floorboard of the car in which the two girls were sitting. 
R.189:82-83,129-30; SE11. They also found a silver spray paint cap on the 
ground near the car. R.189:83,130; SE12. Defendant's hands were smeared with 
silver paint. R.189:57,76-78,87; SE7-10. Paint was also smeared on Juan's hands. 
R.189:57,87. 
Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police. 
R.189:70-72. He told police that Juan had driven him and the two girls to the 
location just moments before Eldridge arrived. R.189:72. He said that they had 
stopped when they heard someone yell out, "RJC," a rival gang of the PVL 
gang. R.189:72,89-90,152-53. He claimed that just after they exited the car, 
Eldridge spotted them. R.189:72. He denied spraying the graffiti, claiming that 
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it was already there when they arrived. R.189:72,78. When asked about the 
silver paint on his hands, Defendant claimed that it came from spray painting a 
bat that was in the trunk of the car. R.189:79. Officers later found two bats in 
the trunk. R.189:79-81,129. One had been spray painted, but it was blue. 
R.189:80. Although Defendant claimed that he had left the PVL gang, he 
admitted that they intended to use the bats to rough up any RJC gang members 
they encountered. R.189:78,80.3 
By the time of trial, a maintenance worker had covered the graffiti on the 
building with primer and paint at a cost of approximately $150. However, he 
had not yet finished the painting to match the rest of the building and estimated 
that it would cost the business between $500 and $1,000 to complete. 
R.189:102,105-08. The profanity on the delivery truck had been painted over, 
but a professional paint job had not yet been completed. R.189:113. Savers 
received a bid of $5,145.20 to repaint the truck. R.189:114-15; SE15. 
3
 At trial, Defendant continued to deny that either he or Juan spray 
painted the graffiti. See R.189:138-51. He admitted to having been affiliated 
with the PVL gang, but claimed that he had left them. R.189:147. He claimed 
that when the foursome arrived, five people fled. R.189:140. He stated that he 
thought his friend was among them, although he believed the others to be rival 
RJC gang members. R.189:140-41,147-48,150. He also claimed that when he 
was handcuffed, he put his hands up against the Savers wall. R.189:142. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury 
finding that he committed criminal mischief in concert with two or more 
persons. He concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish that he 
committed the offense in concert with one person—Juan. He claims, however, 
that it was insufficient to establish that he committed the offense in concert with 
an additional person. 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to establish 
that the unidentified male aided or encouraged in the commission of the crime. 
He was present at the scene. Unlike the two girls, he was not simply sitting in 
the car, but was standing outside the car. Next to the car was a silver spray 
paint cap — the same color used to spray some of the graffiti. When the security 
officer approached him, the unidentified male immediately fled, suggesting 
consciousness of guilt. Moreover, Defendant himself claimed that the graffiti 
had already been sprayed onto the walls when he and Juan arrived. The jury 
may well have accepted that claim in part. They may have reasonably 
concluded that the parties had arranged to spray graffiti at the Savers location, 
that the unidentified male had begun the job, and that Defendant and Juan were 
now completing the job. The unidentified male's immediate flight from the 
scene upon Eldridge's approach supports such a finding. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN CONCERT WITH 
TWO OR MORE PERSONS 
At the close of the State's evidence, Defendant moved for a directed 
verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a group criminal 
activity enhancement. R.189:134-36. The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding that the evidence of Juan's direct involvement in tagging graffiti, 
together with the other male's immediate flight from the scene, was sufficient to 
show encouragement by two other persons. R.189:136-37.4 Defendant 
challenges that ruling on appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-22. 
* * * 
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
reviews the evidence "in the light most favorable to the jury verdict convicting 
him." State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120,121 (Utah App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1999). The Court "'will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon 
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, 
[it] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could 
find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
4
 Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence after his 
conviction in a motion to arrest judgment, which was also denied. R.114,124-15, 
139-38. 
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doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 29,84 P.3d 1183 {, ., : nig State v. Dibello, 
780 P.2d 1 221 1 225 ( Utah 1989)). 
To prevail on a group criminal activity enhancement charge, the State is 
required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] acted in 
concert with two or more persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(l)(a) (West 
2004). The evidence, therefore, must support a jury finding that the defendant 
"was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the 
offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the 
other persons . . . was physically present" or "participated as a party" to the 
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(l)(b). 
Defendant concedes that the evidence in this case was sufficient tc> 
establish that Juan aided in committing the offense of criminal mischief. Aplt. 
Brf. at 16, 21. He argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that a second person aided or encouraged in the commission of the offense. 
Aplt. Brf. at 16-22. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to 
establish that the unidentified male who fled the scene aided or encouraged in 
the commission of the offense. 
It is true that" ' [m]ere presence, or even knowledge, does not make one an 
accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in 
perpetration of the crime/ " Labrum, 959 P.2d at 124 (quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 
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P.2d 1161,1166 (Utah 1980)). The evidence of the unidentified man's complicity, 
however, was more than his mere presence —it included his flight from the 
scene as soon as Eldridge approached. 
The law has long been settled that "[f]light... immediately following the 
commission of a crime [is an] elementf ] which may be considered as evidence of 
implication in that crime/' State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077,1079 
(1951). Admittedly, "a defendant's flight from a crime scene, standing alone, 
'does not support an inference of intentional conduct.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, K 23, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 790 (Utah 1991)). 
However, "the circumstances of a defendant's flight, in addition to other 
circumstantial evidence, may be adequate to support such an inference." Id. 
Such was the case here. 
Unlike the two girls, the unidentified male was standing outside the car in 
which Defendant and Juan had traveled to the scene. R.189:53-54, 60-61. Also 
next to the car was a silver spray paint cap — the color of some of the graffiti. 
R.189:83,130; SE12. In addition, Defendant claimed that graffiti had already 
been sprayed on the walls when he and Juan arrived. R.189:72,78. The jury may 
have reasonably believed this statement in part, concluding that the parties had 
agreed to meet there to spray the graffiti, that the unidentified male had already 
begun the graffiti, and that Defendant and Juan were completing the job. The 
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unidentified male's immediate flight from the scene supported that injti once, 
or, at the very least, the inference that the unidentified male was operating as a 
lookout. Indeed, at trial, Defendant himself acknowledged that he and Juan and 
arrived at the scene to meet a friend. R.189:140-41.5 
In sum, it is undisputed that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury 
finding that Juan aided Defendant in the commission of the offense. Moreover, 
the circumstances of Defendant's flight, together with the other circumstantial 
evidence, was adequate to support a jury finding that the unidentified male also 
aided or encouraged the commission of the offense. The evidence was thus 
sufficient to support the group criminal activity enhancement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the enhancement. 
Respectfully submitted January 25, 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
5
 The State concedes that because the only evidence of the girls' complicity 
was their presence at the scene, the evidence was insufficient to establish that 
they aided or encouraged in the commission of the offense. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code A n 11 k iMvh»ti(lu t 1\\[\\) 
(1) As used in this section, "critical infrastructure" includes: 
(a) information and communication systems; 
(b) financial and banking systems; 
(c) transportation systems; 
(d) any public utility service, including the power, energy, and water 
supply systems; 
(e) sewage and water treatment systems; 
(f) health care facilities as listed in Section 26-21-2, and emergency fire, 
medical, and law enforcement response systems; 
(g) public health facilities and systems; 
(h) food distribution systems; and 
(i) other government operations and services. 
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys 
property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and 
as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or 
impairment of any critical infrastructure; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or 
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or 
caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(3) (a)(i) A violation of Subsection (2) (a) is a third degree felony. 
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony, 
(b) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; 
(ii) third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 
in value; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004) 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in 
value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to 
cause pecuniary loss less than $300 in value. 
(4) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer 
crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any item, computer, computer 
network, computer property, computer services, software, or data includes the 
measurable value of the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to 
replace or restore the items. 
(5) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order 
any person convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, 
state, or local unit of government, or any private business, organization, 
individual, or entity for all expenses incurred in responding to a violation of 
Subsection (2)(b)(ii), unless the court states on the record the reasons why the 
reimbursement would be inappropriate. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-106; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 11, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1996, c. 
142, § 1, eff. April 29,1996; Laws 1997, c. 300, § 1, eff. May 5,1997; Laws 1998, c. 25, § 1, eff. May 4,1998; 
Laws 1999, c. 31, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2002, c. 166, § 6, eff. May 6, 2002. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004) 
Utah Code \nn. $ 76-^201 ) (U i*st .?(I(M| 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to 
an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of 
fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or 
more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in 
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, 
and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to 
engage in the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a 
party if he were an adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall 
cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the 
defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine 
years and which may be for life. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding 
drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004) 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-
503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-
512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, 
Chapter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-
308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and 
Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that 
the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not 
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are 
charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
" O v 
Laws 1990, c. 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3,1999; Laws 2000, c. 214, § 2, 
eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004) 
